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When this Asia Maior issue was finalized and the Covid-19 
pandemic raged throughout the world, Kian Zaccara, 
Greta Maiorano and Giulio Santi, all children of Asia 
Maior authors (Luciano Zaccara, Diego Maiorano and 
Silvia Menegazzi), were born. We (the Asia Maior editors) 
have seen that as a manifestation of Life, reasserting itself 
in front of Thanatos. It is for this reason that we dedicate 
this issue to Kian, Greta and Giulio, with the fond hope that 
they will live in a better world than the one devastated by the 
Covid-19 pandemic.
Foreword
asia in 2019: the escalation oF the us-china contraposition,  
and the authoritarian involution oF asian societies
No meaningful analysis of the continuing political and economic 
evolution of Asia can avoid focusing on the increasingly evident and 
increasingly dangerous contraposition between a declining superpower – 
the US – and a rising one – China. Also, the point must be stressed beyond 
any possible doubt that, at least up to the moment in which this Foreword is 
being penned, the declining power, the US, is still overwhelming powerful 
and, more importantly, overwhelmingly more so than its competitor, China. 
As noted elsewhere1 – there is every reason to believe that, under Donald 
Trump’s dysfunctional and intellectually opaque leadership, the decline of 
the US has accelerated. Nonetheless, US resources remain such that it would 
be unwarranted to expect either an imminent collapse of US power, or even 
a decline of such significance to endanger the US position of most-powerful 
world nation. As history teaches us, the decline of imperial powers – as shown 
by the examples of Rome, Spain, and Britain– are long-drawn, centuries-long 
affairs. Even if history moves today much faster than before, there is every 
reason to think that the collapse of US power is far from being imminent.2
The contraposition between the US and China has long been in the 
making, but it was only during the concluding years of Barack Obama’s 
presidency that the consensus in Washington on China finally and decisively 
shifted. The idea that China had to be engaged as a constructive strategic 
partner and a responsible stakeholder in the US-dominated world order 
was then discarded. The view accepted in its stead was that the Asian giant 
was an increasingly dangerous, unrelenting strategic adversary, whose clear 
ambition was the conquest of world hegemony through the subversion of the 
existing, US-centred world order. As such, China, far from being engaged as 
a friendly country, had to be confronted and faced down.3
During Obama’s second term, the new adversarial consensus on 
China found expression in a well-reasoned and coherent grand policy, 
1.  Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘Asia Maior in 2017: The unravelling of the US for-
eign policy in Asia and its consequences’, Asia Maior 2017, p. 8.
2.  For a discussion of this question, see Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘Premessa: De-
clino e continuità dell’egemonia americana in Asia’, Asia Maior 2009, pp. 9-31.
3.  Ashley J. Tellis, ‘The Return of U.S.-China Strategic Competition’, in Ashley 
J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, & Michael Willis (eds.), ‘U.S.-China competition for global 
influence’, Seattle and Washington, D.C.: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 
2019 (also available on the web at https://www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/pub-
lications/sa20_overview_tellis_dec2019advance.pdf).
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based on two pillars: the «Pivot to Asia», namely the redeployment of the 
bulk of US military forces in the Asia-Pacific area, and the TPP (Trans 
Pacific Partnership), a 12-country free trade agreement.4 The TPP aimed 
at establishing a set of US-decided new rules, which would mould not only 
any future economic interexchange in the Asia-Pacific but the working itself 
of the local economies. Its political aim was the imposition of these new, US-
made rules on China, by confronting Beijing with the dilemma of either 
accepting the Washington-dictated rules, entering the gigantic free market 
created by the TPP, or being excluded from it, with heavy – and possibly 
disastrous – negative consequences for its economy.5
Trump’s presidency did not see the transition from a China policy 
based on engagement to a different one, one centred on active containment, 
but, rather, the transformation of an already existing confrontational policy. 
This transformation, nonetheless, was highlighted as a startlingly new policy, 
which extended the «America First» political approach, espoused by Donald 
Trump during his electoral campaign, to the field of foreign relations. 
The claim that the new President’s foreign policy charted a «new 
course», aimed at «putting the interests and security of the American people 
first»,6 was made credible above all by his particular and flamboyant personal 
style. This claim was so effectively advertised that, by the year under review, 
many analysts and commentators appeared to have become convinced that 
a new cold war, based on the US-China confrontation, had begun.7 In fact, 
if a new cold war began, it happened not under the Trump administration 
but under that of his predecessor.
Once the continuity in the Trump administration’s China policy as 
compared with the preceding administration has been underlined, it is none-
theless important to clarify the distinctive features of the «America First» anti-
China Trumpian strategy. These were many,8 but for the purpose of putting 
in perspective the essays included in this volume, only two will be highlighted.
4.  In 2016 the TPP included Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam, and the United States.
5.  Francesca Congiu, ‘China in 2014: China and the Pivot to Asia’, Asia Maior 
2014, pp. 15-41.
6.  The White House, Fact Sheets, President Donald J. Trump’s Foreign Policy Puts 
America First, 30 January 2018.
7.  Some analysts claimed that 2019 marked the actual starting point of the new 
Cold War between the two countries. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, ‘A New Cold War 
Has Begun’, Foreign Policy, 7 January 2019; Niall Ferguson, ‘The New Cold War? It’s 
With China, and It Has Already Begun’, The New York Times, 2 December 2019; Min-
ghao Zhao, ‘Is a New Cold War Inevitable? Chinese Perspectives on US–China Strate-
gic Competition’, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, 12, 3, 2019, pp. 371–394.
8.  Ashley J. Tellis – calling them «avenues of resistance» (to China’s aggressive 
challenge to «overall U.S. hegemony in the international system») – lists no less than 
six distinctive features of Trump’s anti-China policy. Ashley J. Tellis, ‘The Return of 
U.S.-China Strategic Competition’, pp. 11, 26-31.
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The first and most visible hallmark of the transformation of the US 
China policy under Trump was the abandonment of any caution in high-
lighting the administration’s confrontational stand vis-à-vis China. Contrary 
to the caution which had surrounded the enunciation of the Obamian anti-
China policy – which, to a certain extent, had disguised its real objective, 
namely taming what had come to be seen as the US’ main world competitor 
– the fact that the US now viewed China as a strategic rival was, so to speak, 
shouted from the rooftops. 
The other hallmark of the transformation of the US China policy un-
der Trump was the abrupt jettisoning of the economic containment network 
that Barack Obama had been building around China through the TPP. This 
decision, in line with Donald Trump’s anti-globalist and anti-multilateral 
pacts inclination, was coupled with the reliance on the threat of overwhelm-
ing military force, strengthened by a series of bilateral military pacts with 
those Asian countries which felt threatened by China’s rise.
Openly branding China as the most dangerous strategic rival of the 
US began soon after Trump’s election. As pointed out in the Foreword to 
the previous Asia Maior volume, it was made clear beyond any possible 
doubt in a series of public statements and official documents: the speech 
on US-India relations, given by then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (18 
October 2017), the publication of the new document on the National Secu-
rity Strategy (NSS) (18 December 2017), and then-US Secretary of Defense 
James Mattis’ public enunciation of the summary of the National Defense 
Strategy (NDS) (19 January 2018).9 To these statements and documents – al-
ready discussed in the Foreword to the previous Asia Maior issue – one must 
add the publication, in November 2019, of the Department of State’s A Free 
and Open Indo-Pacific. Advancing a Shared Vision. In it, the US approach to 
«an Indo-Pacific composed of open societies and open markets» was coun-
terpoised to that of China, based on the practice of repression «at home and 
abroad».10 The Vision was especially critical of the repressive practices which, 
according to the document, the People’s Republic of China employed «at 
home and abroad». According to the Vision: «Such practices, which Beijing 
exports to other countries through its political and economic influence, un-
dermine the conditions that have promoted stability and prosperity in the 
Indo-Pacific for decades».11 The reference to Beijing’s «political and eco-
9.  On the 2017 NSS document see Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘Asia Maior in 2017: 
The unravelling of the US foreign policy in Asia and its consequences’, Asia Maior 
2017, p. 15; on the NSS of 18 December 2017 and the presentation of the summary 
of the NDS of 19 January 2018, see Michelguglielmo Torri & Nicola Mocci, ‘Fore-
word. Asia Maior in 2018: Caught between Trump’s trade and sanctions war and the 
internal problems of inequality and exploitation’, Asia Maior 2018, pp. 9-10.
10.  US Department of State, A Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Advancing a Shared 
Vision, 4 November 2019, p. 21.
11.  Ibid.
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nomic influence» was a not-so-veiled critique of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), seen by Washington as Beijing’s attempt to create a sphere of influ-
ence based on radically different values than the ones advanced by the US.
The jettisoning of the TPP promotion, namely the second 
hallmark highlighting the transformation of the US’ China policy under 
Trump, also became apparent immediately after the election of the new 
President. Although in line with the aforementioned Trumpian aversion of 
globalisation and disdain for multinational pacts and organisations, it was 
a frankly disconcerting decision. There is every reason to think that it was 
seen with dismay even by some ruling circles in Washington. Certainly, the 
reintroduction of some form of US economic support to the Asian countries 
within the US political sphere of influence was welcomed by most US decision 
makers and, indeed, realised, although in a limited fashion, in 2018.12 The 
attempt to find some economic props for the Trumpian US’ China policy 
was however de facto undermined by the President himself. A great deal of 
political and scholarly attention has been devoted to the fact that one of 
the highlights of the Trumpian foreign policy was the trade war on China, 
started in 2018 by the US President with his decision to impose tariffs on 
imported industrial and technology goods from the East Asian country. The 
focus on China, however, often obscures the fact that China, while the main 
target of the trade war unlashed by Trump, was far from being the only one. 
The trade war was simply part of Trump’s «America first» policy, which the 
US President and his administration pursued not only against China but 
all nations with a favourable commercial balance vis-à-vis the US. Hence, 
Washington’s goal became that of forcing the «erring» countries to tilt their 
trade balance towards parity, lest they risk the imposition of punitive tariffs 
on their imports. This amounted to the unleashing of a trade war not only 
on China, but on most US formal allies and non-treaty partners in the Indo-
Pacific region, and could not but make redundant the limited programme of 
economic support launched in place of the TPP, and endanger Washington’s 
relations with most of its Asian formal and informal allies.13

During the year under review, since the start of the US policy of 
China containment, Beijing determinedly moved to counter Washington’s 
increasingly confrontational posture, both at the rhetoric and factual level, 
in Asia and world-wide. 
At the rhetorical level, Beijing argued that the trade imbalance with 
the US, in its favour, was the natural result of free trade rather than unfair 
practices, as alleged by the US. Also, Beijing constantly rejected claims that 
12.  Michelguglielmo Torri & Nicola Mocci, ‘Foreword. Asia Maior in 2018’, p. 11.
13.  Michelguglielmo Torri, ‘Asia Maior in 2017: The unravelling of the US for-
eign policy in Asia and its consequences’, Asia Maior 2017, pp. 9-11. 
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the BRI represented an expansionist economic and ultimately military en-
deavour. As noted by Barbara Onnis in her comprehensive assessment of the 
major developments in Chinese foreign policy in 2019, the Chinese leader-
ship made use of the 2nd BRI forum held in Beijing (25-27 April 2019) both 
to showcase the BRI acceptance by major international organisations and 
consultation fora, such as G20 and the World Bank, and to challenge the 
US narrative of the BRI being a «debt trap» for the countries involved in it. 
The 2019 White Paper China’s National Defense in the New Era was an-
other example of Beijing’s attempt to highlight its outlook on the most 
pressing international and domestic matters. With regards to its own global 
ambitions, the document stated that «China will never follow the beaten 
track of big powers in seeking hegemony» and that it «will never threaten 
any other country or seek any sphere of influence».14 With specific refer-
ence to the US, and how China perceives its moves, the White Paper stated 
that, as international competition was growing, the US «has provoked and 
intensified competition among major countries, significantly increased its 
defense expenditure, pushed for additional capacity in nuclear, outer space, 
cyber and missile defense, and undermined global strategic stability.»15 
On a practical level, during the year under review President Xi Jin-
ping was engaged in what Barbara Onnis describes as a «tireless summit 
diplomacy», which saw the Chinese leader travelling throughout the world 
and attending «hundreds of bilateral and multilateral meetings». 
Among them, the Chinese President’s visit to Russia in June 2019 de-
serves particular mention, as this visit marked the apex of years of growing 
economic and military cooperation between Moscow and Beijing. Beyond 
the long-standing cooperation channelled through the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation (SCO), the Sino-Russian partnership featured regular 
joint military exercises as well as an ever-stronger energy collaboration in 
both the oil and gas sectors. While it is unclear at the time of writing wheth-
er or not the Sino-Russian entente will transform into a fully-fledged alliance, 
it nevertheless represented a key geopolitical alignment that brought to-
gether two of the most prominent revisionist powers in global geopolitics.16 
Beyond the Russian case, the results of Xi’s diplomatic activism in 
the year under review are, however, a contentious point. According to Bar-
bara Onnis, they were «both positive and negative». «While Xi Jinping was 
successful in pursuing personal relations with his Indian and Japanese 
counterparts, that could be used to address the trust deficit with both the 
14.  The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 
‘China’s National Defense in the New Era’, July 2019, p. 8.
15.  Ibid.
16.  Marcin Kaczmarski, ‘The Moscow-Beijing Relationship: Increasingly Asym-
metrical and Resilient’, Australian Institute of International Affairs, 2 July 2019; Lyle J. 
Goldstein, ‘The Fate of the China-Russia Alliance’, The National Interest, 25 January 
2020.
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neighbouring countries – points out Onnis – the same cannot be said for 
the Chinese government’s attempt to reassure one of its most relevant part-
ners, namely the EU». Here, however, the problem is that good «personal 
relations» appear to be a widely overrated element in assessing the actual 
state of relations between sovereign countries. To be convinced of this it is 
enough to refer to the strange case of the continuing allegedly good per-
sonal relations between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping in a period when, 
according to most analysts and commentators, the increasingly adversarial 
relations between their respective countries had become so extreme as to 
justify the judgement that a new cold war had begun. 
No doubt, in 2018 Trump’s policy of forcing countries with a favour-
able balance of trade vis-à-vis the US to tilt their trade balance towards 
parity provoked the ill-concealed negative reaction of some key US allies or 
quasi-allies, in particular Japan and India. It was a negative reaction which 
opened the possibility of an international realignment on the part of Tokyo 
and New Delhi, characterised by a more or less deliberate move away from 
the US sphere of influence and a parallel gradual thawing of relations with 
China. Xi Jinping’s diplomatic effort to bridge the historical gap separating 
China from Japan and India addressed the disquiet felt because of Trump’s 
aggressive trade policies, and was designed to promote personal good rela-
tions with both Shinzō Abe and Narendra Modi. 
Xi Jinping’s attempted rapprochement, however, although ostensibly 
impressive, was short in substance. In fact, as Giulio Pugliese and Sebastian 
Maslow argue in this Asia Maior issue, in 2019 Japan’s foreign policy was 
characterised by an ever-closer relationship with the US, while simultane-
ously maintaining the country’s security agenda squarely focused on how 
to engage and contain China. Accordingly, the limited 2019 Sino-Japanese 
rapprochement was coupled with an unprecedented level of engagement 
between Japanese Prime Minister Abe and US President Trump. As pointed 
out by Pugliese and Maslow, the «Japanese government was mostly satisfied 
with the Trump administration’s foreign and security policy recalibration, 
and essentially welcomed America’s more confrontational China policy». 
Clearly, during 2019, Washington and Tokyo appeared aligned on a num-
ber of issues, primarily on their interpretation of the BRI, especially its 
maritime component, as a geopolitical endeavour aimed at strengthening 
Beijing’s economic and, in the long run, military clout in the Indo-Pacific. 
The Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept – at the core of the Trump 
administration’s Asia policy – provided a common ground for cementing 
also the ties between India and the US. As Yogesh Joshi argues in his article, 
the strategic relationship between New Delhi and Washington – which in 
2018 had appeared to be threatened by the US aggressive trade policies – 
recovered during 2019, it being strengthened notably through a 2+2 minis-
terial dialogue, bringing together the foreign and defence ministers of both 
countries. In spite of the novel good personal climate characterising the 
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Xi-Modi relations ever since 2018, any real progress in India’s relations with 
China remained hostage to territorial disputes and appeared hampered by 
a growing Sino-Pakistani partnership (its most visible manifestation being 
the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). According to Joshi’s appraisal, in 
the year under review India unambiguously sided with the US in the global 
struggle for hegemony. Interestingly, this happened after a period in 2018 
which saw India doubt the wisdom of maintaining its US connection as the 
keystone of its foreign policy. It is worth stressing that, in firmly siding with 
Washington in 2019, New Delhi made the choice of favouring a policy which 
advanced the expansion of its own military power, rather than its economic 
interests. But, significantly, overlooking a declining economy and focusing 
instead on the pursuit of political goals related to its own brand of «Hindu 
nationalism» is what, during the year under review, characterised the Modi 
government’s policies, even domestically.

In the end, in 2019 Beijing’s effort at countering Washington’s strat-
egy of containment had limited or disappointing results as far as China’s re-
lations with the EU, Japan and India were concerned. However, in the year 
under review as in previous years, the Sino-US rivalry took place in a series 
of other geographical theatres, where its results were sometimes different.
Outside India, in South Asia the Sino-US competition mainly played 
out in two contexts, Pakistan and Nepal. With regards to the former, it is 
worth stressing once again that Pakistan is at the very heart of China’s BRI 
strategy, as shown by the planning of the China-Pakistan Economic Cor-
ridor (CPEC). The CPEC is a set of infrastructural and energy investments 
worth around US$ 20 billion, whose political and economic implications, 
analysed by Marco Corsi in this and previous Asia Maior issues, are hard 
to overestimate. Given its relevance on the wider global chessboard, CPEC 
and the related investment practices have been the object of a great deal 
of scrutiny and adverse criticism, especially by the US administration. In 
particular, in November 2019 Ambassador Alice Wells, the principal deputy 
assistant secretary of State for South and Central Asia at the US Department 
of State, made public the US’ concerns about CPEC, criticising the issues of 
cost, debt, jobs and transparency of Chinese investments in Pakistan. She 
noted how, «in contrast to the Chinese Communist Party, the United States 
leads a vision for the Indo-Pacific region that is free and open». She also 
called Islamabad to «ask Beijing the tough questions and insist on account-
ability, fairness and transparency». «Ask the Chinese government – she con-
cluded – why it’s pursuing a development model in Pakistan that significant-
ly deviates from what brought China its own economic success».17 Pakistan’s 
17.  United States Department of State, ‘A Conversation with Ambassador Alice 
Wells on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor’, 21 November 2019.
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Foreign Office and the Chinese Ambassador’s reaction to Wells’ remarks 
was immediate, with Beijing’s ambassador to Islamabad, Yao Jing, saying 
he was «shocked and surprised» and asking the media to play an impor-
tant role in countering anti-CPEC propaganda.18 Ultimately, the increased 
pressure exercised by the US was not particularly successful  in weakening 
Sino-Pakistani relations. Of course, this is a far from surprising result, con-
sidering that the Sino-Pakistani alliance is a cornerstone both in the case of 
Pakistan’s foreign policy and China’s BRI strategy.    
Less evident, but equally significant, is the case of Nepal. As noted 
by Matteo Miele, Nepal’s leadership had to strike a careful balancing act 
in 2019 when managing its relations with the United States, China and 
India. The deepening ties between Kathmandu and Beijing, exemplified 
by the number and relevance of agreements signed during Xi Jinping’s 
visit to the country in October 2019, were perceived as a threat both by 
India – which, as noted by Yogesh Joshi, considers China’s inroads into its 
immediate neighbourhood a major concern – and the US, which is keen 
to cajole countries into its Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Overall, 
during 2019, Beijing’s growing clout in Nepal was visible, with over 90% 
of foreign direct investment (FDI) in this Himalayan country coming from 
China. This, coupled with the deal signed in 2018 by Huawei to develop 4G 
infrastructure in Nepal, demonstrates that the relationship between Beijing 
and Kathmandu has become increasingly close.19 
In Afghanistan, as Filippo Boni points out, the US remained the 
primary international actor in 2019, as shown by its proactive policy aimed 
at negotiating a peace deal with the Taleban. Peace in Afghanistan was an 
objective very eagerly sought by Donald Trump, in view of the approaching 
2020 US presidential elections. China, nonetheless, continued to be a keen 
actor, attempting to mediate a political settlement in the country. Here 
too, as with the US, domestic considerations were paramount: no doubt, 
China’s effort to stabilise its Western periphery was the main driver behind 
its engagement with Afghanistan. 
Equally interesting is the case of Mongolia. The latter finds itself in 
the difficult position of being caught between her inevitable dependence 
on Russia and China, and the convenience of promoting positive relations 
with the US. As Axel Berkofsky reports in his article, 90% of Mongolia’s 
exports are to China, and the latter accounts for more than one third of 
Mongolia’s imports, in addition to being its major foreign investor. Simi-
larly, Mongolia’s economic relations with Russia have grown significantly in 
the past few years, as a result of the Kremlin’s renewed interest in Mongolia 
as a potential transit corridor for goods and energy supplies to, and from, 
China. In this situation, Russia, Mongolia and China established, under the 
18.  ‘Chinese Ambassador in Pakistan Yao Jing is shocked and surprised’, Times 
of Islamabad, 23 November 2019.
19.  Rupert Stone, ‘China’s silent foray into Nepal’, TRT World, 21 October 2019. 
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aegis of the BRI, the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC) 
in 2014. Furthermore, in 2019 Russia pledged to invest US$ 1.5 billion to 
be used to modernise Mongolia’s railways. Against such backdrop of heavy 
economic dependence, Mongolia’s decision to sign a Strategic Partnership 
Agreement in July 2019 with the United States caught many observers by 
surprise. The agreement came in the wake of the US Department of De-
fence’s Indo-Pacific Strategy report, which referred to Mongolia as one of 
the «natural partners of the United States» in the region. The US’ strategy 
– aimed at scoring a political point by obtaining Ulaanbaatar’s support for 
the Indo-Pacific strategy – also included an economic component through 
the Mongolia Third Neighbor Trade Bill. Introduced into Congress on 10 
April 2019, the Bill, in sharp contrast with the usual US trade policy under 
Trump, intended to grant Mongolian cashmere duty-free access to the Unit-
ed States, creating great potential for growth in Mongolia’s cashmere and 
textile industry. Its political goal was offering the land-locked Asian nation 
an alternative economic option to the ones provided by China and Russia. 
As Berkofsky notes, Beijing’s reaction to these developments was to warn 
«Mongolia not to ‘misbehave’» by teaming up with Washington on a level 
«too close for comfort for Beijing». The whole episode, which at the time of 
writing had not yet reached its conclusion, demonstrates both the difficul-
ties and opportunities for third countries, created by the escalating tensions 
between China and the US.
Another flashpoint in the US-China rivalry during the year under re-
view was Vietnam. As shown by Nicola Mocci, in 2019 the Vietnamese econ-
omy witnessed two main developments related to the China-US confronta-
tion. The first was the increase in Chinese FDI in Vietnam and the relocation 
of Chinese companies there. The second was the steep increase of made-
in-China goods that were exported first to Vietnam and then – after being 
labelled as Vietnamese – re-exported to the US. Nonetheless, the attempt 
to bypass higher US tariffs did not pass unnoticed by the Trump adminis-
tration. As pointed out by Mocci: «In June, the President himself described 
Vietnam as “almost the single-worst abuser of everybody”». More important-
ly: «Words were soon followed by deeds. The US Commerce Department 
imposed duties of more than 400% on steel imports from Vietnam».

In 2019, if the US-China increasingly-harsh contraposition was the 
main development in Asia, at least one other occurrence must be highlight-
ed as characterising the year under review in many of the Asian countries 
analysed in the present Asia Maior issue. As observed in previous years, and 
in line with events in the remainder of the world, political freedom radically 
contracted. By looking at Freedom House scores for the countries included 
in this Asia Maior volume, we find six which are not-free (China, North 
Korea, Vietnam, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan), four that are partly 
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free (the Philippines, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan) and only six that are free 
(Japan, Mongolia, Taiwan, Timor Leste, India, South Korea). However, one 
of the countries classified as free by Freedom House, India, includes a ter-
ritory, indicated as «Indian Kashmir», that Freedom House itself classifies 
as «Not Free».20  
The snapshot given by Freedom House is possibly over-optimistic. It 
does not register the contraction of the spaces of freedom across the border, 
affecting – with very few exceptions – all kind of countries, from the «Not 
Free», to the «Partly Free», to those officially classified as «Free».
The most egregious example of a country «Not Free», which has seen 
a fast and conspicuous reduction of political liberty, is China. As document-
ed by Silvia Menegazzi, under Xi Jinping’s increasingly authoritarian lead-
ership, even education – in an Orwellian move – has been transformed into 
a tool to mould the individual mentality according to the indications of the 
one and only leader. 
Another example worth remembering, drawn from the class of coun-
tries classified by Freedom House as «Not Free», is that of Kazakhstan. As 
shown by Paolo Sorbello, in the Central Asian country, in spite of the un-
expected decision made public in March by Nursultan Nazarbayev to step 
down from the presidency, the former President continued to be firmly in 
control of the ultimate power. Also, the harassing of opposition forces and 
independent media persons continued unabated.
Finally, among the countries characterised by Freedom House as «Not 
Free», the case of Myanmar is worth recalling. Even Myanmar is a most 
distressing example of political involution, in particular when one thinks of 
the high hopes once engendered by Aung San Suu Kyi and her democratic 
credentials. During the year under review, as shown by Matteo Fumagalli, 
there was no significant progress in the solution of the shameful problem 
of the Rohingya refugees. At the same time, a new insurrectional wave, led 
by the Arakan Army, started in the Rakhine state and spread throughout 
Myanmar’s northern and eastern borderlands. At the closing of the year – 
when Aung San Suu Kyi was in The Hague, defending her country from the 
accusation of genocide before the International Court of Justice, and the 
campaign for the 2020 parliamentary elections was underway – the hopes 
for any kind of significant democratic progress in Myanmar appeared to be 
illusionary.21
20.  Freedom House, Countries and Territories (https://freedomhouse.org/coun-
tries/freedom-world/scores).
21.  On the problem of the «authoritarian resilience» characterising the political 
system in Myanmar see: Stefano Ruzza, Giuseppe Gabusi & Davide Pellegrino, ‘Au-
thoritarian resilience through top-down transformation: making sense of Myanmar’s 
incomplete transition’, Italian Political Science Review/Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politica, 
49, Special Issue 2 (Autocracy Strikes Back: Authoritarian Resurgence in the Early 
21st Century), July 2019, pp. 193-209. 
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Examples of the deteriorating situation of «Partly Free» countries are 
those offered by Malaysia and the Philippines. In Malaysia, as shown by 
Saleena Saleem, the political context was characterised by the eruption of 
a spate of ethno-religious controversies «that only served to exacerbate the 
inter-ethnic distrust». These controversies were promoted by the two main 
opposition parties’ «polarising fear-mongering rhetoric», and were fed by 
«the ineffectual and disunited responses» of the coalition in power. Sadly, at 
the end of the year under review, Malaysian society appeared divided once 
again along communal lines. Ethno-religious ideologies were still a force to 
be reckoned with, with the potential to seriously damage social peace and 
political progress. 
Even more worrying was the case of the Philippines. As Sol Iglesias 
and Lala Ordenes show in their article, under President Rodrigo Duterte the 
country was reverting from democratic to authoritarian rule. The authors 
detail how the process of democratic deconsolidation was progressively tak-
ing place in the country, through a systematic weakening of the opposition 
and attacks on media freedoms and human rights. These actions were cou-
pled with an active erosion of democratic institutions, in particular the ju-
diciary, and a simultaneous strengthening of the military and the executive. 
Among the territories assessed by Freedom House, there is Hong 
Kong, which is classified as «Partly Free». During the year under review, 
this de facto city state was in the grip of a major democratic crisis, which, 
while less significant than similar developments in other parts of Asia – as 
exemplified in particular by the Philippines, discussed above, and India, 
on which more later – was closely monitored by the Western press. This 
conveyed the impression, at least in the West, that the events in Hong Kong 
were of epochal importance and a crucial struggle for democracy. Indeed, 
the Hong Kong crisis was serious and a struggle for democracy. Its impor-
tance, nonetheless, was undeniably inferior to other – sadly unreported by 
the Western media – analogous confrontations in other parts of Asia. 
Once the above has been pointed out, it is safe to assert that the 
events in the city state in 2019 can only be fully understood by highlighting 
the interconnected nature of the different roots of the crisis. On the one 
hand, it was propelled by internal causes; on the other the position of the 
city state in the Chinese area of influence deeply conditioned the political 
space of the protest. 
As Angela Tritto and Abdulkadir Alkan detail in their analysis, the 
Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Bill protests represented the largest mobili-
sation of people in the Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China since 
the Hong Kong handover in 1997. The roots of the protests can be found in 
the shifting values and identities of the younger generation; nonetheless a 
full assessment of the dynamics of the Hong Kong struggle would be incom-
plete without its contextualisation within the wider framework of China’s 
increasing global reach, for which Hong Kong represents «a key node».
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At the closing of the year under review, no final result of the Hong 
Kong crisis was in the offing. Nonetheless, in the context of Hong Kong’s 
geopolitical, strategic and economic importance for China, it is difficult to 
be optimistic about the success of the pro-democracy forces.
None of the above examples of the contraction of political liberties 
is, however, as worrying as the one represented by the political involution 
of a country that Freedom House classifies as «Free», namely India. Con-
sidered the world’s largest democracy, India is usually viewed as a success 
story in managing diversity. However, since Narendra Modi became prime 
minister in 2014, India has gone through a progressive erosion of its politi-
cal liberties, well documented in previous Asia Maior issues. This erosion 
has become headlong after Modi’s massive – and from many viewpoints 
unexpected – victory at the 2019 general election (discussed by Diego Maio-
rano). Since then, in Michelguglielmo Torri’s appraisal, a «systematic and 
massive assault» on Indian democracy has taken place. 
The on India’s democracy was primarily articulated around two areas. 
First, two key articles of the Indian Constitution, which had guaranteed the 
autonomy of Jammu & Kashmir, the only Union state with a Muslim major-
ity, were hollowed out and the state was de facto transformed into an internal 
colony brutally ruled through military force. Second, there was the attempt to 
modify the concept of Indian citizenship by introducing a religious criterion 
aimed at excluding persons of Muslim religion. While protests mounted in 
the country against this second decision of the Modi government, these two 
developments amounted to the most massive democratic crisis in India since 
the infamous imposition of the «internal emergency» regime of 1975-77, 
which saw then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi take over dictatorial powers.  

To the above drawn picture of contracting political liberties, there are, 
nevertheless, some exceptions, in particular those represented by Taiwan 
– expertly analysed by Aurelio Insisa – and South Korea – knowledgeably 
discussed by Marco Milani. Particularly interesting, however, are the cases 
of two countries which Asia Maior examines for the first time in this issue: 
Mongolia and Timor Leste.
The small island state of Timor Leste is an enthralling case, on which 
it is worth briefly dwelling, if for no other reason than the immense amount 
of suffering and resilience which made the country a success story. In fact, 
the Timorese democracy is the outcome of a long and harrowing struggle 
against Indonesian colonialism, covertly supported by an Australia only in-
terested in promoting its own egoistic national goal of exploiting the natu-
ral wealth of the Timor Gap. Although badly served by the UN, Timor Leste 
has succeeded in reaching not only independence but in creating a working 
democracy. In recent years this democracy has experienced some difficul-
ties, but, as shown by Rui Feijó, these difficulties, far from signalling the 
21
danger of an imminent democratic collapse, are those typical of the semi-
presidential form of government chosen by the small island state. In fact, 
as argued by Feijó: «In any semi-presidential regimes the risk of conflict 
between a president and a prime minister representing different political 
forces is high, as shown by the well-known experience of France and many 
other countries having adopted this system». In turn, this results from the 
fact that, in the semi-presidential system, both the president and the prime 
minister enjoy «a direct electoral legitimacy that sustains their claims to a 
fair share of power».  Hence, there is every hope that this small democracy 
will go on successfully pursuing the goal of enhancing both political liberties 
and economic well-being for its people.     
Mongolia too is a most interesting case of democratic endurance and 
success. Surrounded by the two biggest authoritarian states in the world – 
China and Russia – this landlocked country has nevertheless been, since the 
1990 revolution, a «democratic oasis». As in the case of Timor Leste, Mon-
golia’s political system is semi presidential; in it a 76-member unicameral 
legislature cohabits with a directly-elected president. As pointed out by Axel 
Berkofsky, and as shown by the above-mentioned case of Timor Leste, this 
kind of system does not work at its best when the prime minister and the 
president are expressed by different political majorities. This has been the 
case in Mongolia during the past 30 years. Nonetheless – as pointed out by 
Berkofsky – the existence itself of such a political system is evidence of the 
fact that «democracy is functioning and that the parties and politicians in 
power or opposition are making use of their constitutionally-granted rights 
and mandates». In fact, in the case of Mongolia, this system has shown itself 
to be resilient enough to resist and stop the authoritarian temptations of 
President Khaltmaagiin Battulga, a populist politician sometimes described 
as the «Trump of the steppe». The resilience of Mongolian democracy be-
came apparent in 2019, during a crisis which saw the attempt, piloted by 
President Battulga, to reduce the independence of the judiciary. The law 
aimed at this goal, initially adopted by parliament in March 2019, was how-
ever superseded by the passing of additional legislation in mid-November. 
The November legislation streamlined the powers of both the prime min-
ister and parliament and stipulated that the presidential terms «will, from 
2025, be limited to one six-year term as opposed to the current two four-
year terms».

At the conclusion of our discussion of the contraction of political lib-
erty in Asia – and to conclude this Foreword – it is opportune to briefly deal 
with a problem which, although not central to the essays included in this 
Asia Maior issue, is crucial in the anti-China discourse promoted by the 
Trump administration. This is the idea that China’s influence abroad trans-
lates into the encouragement of the anti-democratic and authoritarian ten-
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dencies so visible in the majority of Asian countries. While it is possible to 
produce examples, such as the Philippines, which would seem to strengthen 
this theory, there is no doubt in the mind of the authors of these lines that 
the theory in question is a simplistic and possibly disingenuous explanation 
of a much more complex problem. To try to begin to give a more correct 
answer, the first point that must be highlighted is that the decline of politi-
cal liberties – in Asia as elsewhere – has both endogenous and exogenous 
causes. If we take what, in this Foreword, is indicated as the most worrying 
case of political involution in Asia, that of India, it is beyond doubt that 
no present-day exogenous influence is behind it. The extremely worrying, 
rapid and conspicuous erosion of democracy in India has nothing to do 
with China’s influence or Chinese authoritarian ideologies. It is a phenom-
enon grounded on the intellectual historical roots of political Hinduism, or, 
as it is nowadays fashionable to call it, «Hindu nationalism». Of course, as 
shown by historical research, political Hinduism was deeply influenced by 
two closely connected foreign ideologies, namely Fascism and Nazism. But 
this happened in the 1930s and early 1940s.22 Since then, the nefarious ide-
ology of «Hindu nationalism» has evolved autonomously, without any need 
of exogenous feeding, in particular from China, which political Hinduism 
considers as a dangerous enemy.
Coming to the exogenous influences behind the progressive crisis of 
political liberties in many Asian countries, and besides China’s influence, 
another one is present and extremely dangerous, even if rarely or ever put 
under the focus of analysis by western or pro-West commentators. It is the 
influence of that extremely regressive version of Islam that is Wahhabi Is-
lam. In previous decades its influence has spread throughout the world, but 
most particularly in Asia, thanks to the generous financial and organisation-
al efforts on the part of that faithful ally of the West, but most particularly of 
the US: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.23 
Unfortunately, for reasons beyond the control of the Asia Maior edi-
tors, this issue is the second in succession without an essay focused on the 
most populous Muslim country world-wide: Indonesia. Indonesia, neverthe-
less, is a most glaring case in point, illustrating the deleterious effects of the 
Saudi Arabia-promoted Wahhabi Islam. As shown by the latest Indonesia-
related essays published in Asia Maior and other research, during previous 
decades the open and tolerant Islam which was characteristic of Indonesia24 
22.  E.g., Marzia Casolari, ‘Hindutva’s Foreign Tie-Up in the 1930s: Archival 
Evidence’, Economic and Political Weekly, 35, 4, 22-28 January 2000, pp. 218-228.
23.  For one of the few studies on Saudi Arabia’s promotion of Wahabi Islam 
worldwide, see James M. Dorsey, ‘Creating Frankenstein: The Impact of Saudi Export 
Ultra-Conservatism in South Asia’, Social Science Research Network, 24 July 2016.  
24.  On the original characteristics of the Indonesian Islam see Clifford Geertz, 
Islam Observed. Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1971 (1st edition 1968). 
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has been undergoing a most worrying mutation, becoming an increasingly 
intolerant, aggressive and anti-libertarian religious ideology, which has in 
fact narrowed the space of political liberty.25 A similar involution, even if less 
pronounced, is visible in Malaysia, as shown by Saleena Saleem.
The decline of democracy and the contraction of political liberties in 
most of Asia – and in most of the world – is a quite serious and extremely 
worrying issue. The explanation of its causes – which, at the end of the day, 
is the necessary first step to counter this extremely dangerous and highly 
disquieting phenomenon – should not be held hostage to the anti-China 
discourse, promoted by the Trump administration to prop up the declining 
world position of the US.    
Michelguglielmo Torri, Nicola Mocci & Filippo Boni
25.  E.g. Tomáš Petrů, ‘Jokowi’s not so surprising re-election: A victory for 
«moderate» Islamism in Indonesia?’, Home Publications CEIAS Insights, 30 May 2019; 
Edward Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner, ‘Southeast Asia’s Troubling Elections: Nondem-
ocratic Pluralism in Indonesia’, Journal of Democracy, 30, 4, January 2019, pp. 104-
118; Meredith L. Weiss, ‘Indonesia in 2019. Democracy and Its Critics’, Asian Survey, 
60, 1, January/February 2020, pp. 109-116.

